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The Justiciability of the Right to Development 
in Ghana: Mirage or Possibility?
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Abstract
An analysis of the debate on the right to development (RTD) suggests that 
the right is pursued as a solution to solve the problems of poverty and under-
development. Thus, this study seeks to determine if at the national level in Ghana, 
the right to development is a right which is opposable by right-holders against the 
duty bearers. The Study adopted the Black Letter Law approach in analysing the 
legal effect of relevant law.
This study shows that the African Charter is the only multinational treaty that 
makes RTD legally enforceable. It also shows that Ghana, which is dualist, has 
not ratified the African Charter. It is however argued that the Ghanaian courts 
may enforce RTD either as international law or as a human right implicitly 
guaranteed under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This conclusion supports the 
notion that development is a human rights concern. It further illustrates that the 
national courts of African countries are uniquely equipped to guarantee the pro-
tection of human rights and the development of the African people.
I. Introduction 
The world, as we know it today, is characterised by vast and deep-rooted 
inequalities among States. Following the establishment of  the United Nations 
(hereinafter referred to as the UN) and the realisation of  world peace and secu-
rity, the question as to whether the international community bears some respon-
sibility for assisting states whose resources are inadequate to ensure the human 
rights of  their own citizens, or for providing direct assistance to those individuals 
* The author is an LL.B graduate from the Kwame Nkurumah University of  Science and Technology 
in Kumasi, Ghana.
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in dire need has been the subject of  intense debate.1 Since 1977, much of  this 
debate has been pursued within the field of  human rights under the rubric of  the 
‘right to development.’2
In international discourse, there has been relentless debate on the validity 
of  this right to development. In 1977, however, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights recognized the right. It was then enshrined by the General Assembly in 
the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development (hereinafter referred to as the 
UNDRD).3 Yet even after this occurrence, the question of  whether the right to 
development is even a right remains a contentious one.
On one side of  this debate are developing countries who are proponents of  
the right to development. One of  the arguments advanced by such developing 
economies is that the right to development is built on the principle of  interna-
tional solidarity that obliges developed nations to support developing ones to 
attain development.4 On the other side are some donor countries like the United 
States; that reject the existence of  such a right and alternatively argue that the 
duty is incumbent upon any nation to ensure that its human rights regime is con-
ducive enough to encourage development.5
It is submitted that the backdrop against which it is argued that the devel-
oped countries of  the world should support developing ones to attain develop-
ment is the glaring hardship and poverty that characterises third-world econo-
mies mostly found on the African continent. It will therefore appear that the 
right to development is pursued as a solution to the problems of  poverty and 
under-development. Thus, this study shall seek to determine whether, at the na-
tional level in Ghana, the right to development is a right which is opposable by 
right holders against the duty bearers. Is it a justiciable right? Is it legally enforce-
able through the means of  legislation and legal policy?
1 Steiner J H and Alston P, International human rights in context; law, politics, morals, text and materials, 2ed, 
Oxford University Press 2000, 1319.
2 Steiner and Alston, International human rights in context; law, politics, morals, text and materials, 2ed, 1319.
3 Steiner and Alston, International human rights in context; law, politics, morals, text and materials, 1319.
4 Steiner and Alston, International human rights in context; law, politics, morals text and materials, 1319.
5 Marks S, ‘The human right to development: between rhetoric and reality’ Vol 17 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal (2004), 137.
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II. The Concept of Development
The concept of  development connotes progress particularly the economic 
wealth and fortitude of  a state. This, more often than not, translates into im-
provement in the national GDP, balance of  payments and similar economic in-
dicators. In recent discourse, the concept of  development is understood to go 
beyond economic statistics and enter into the realm of  actual satisfaction of  
human needs and freedoms.6 For instance in Ghana, the concept is said to mean 
the ‘satisfaction of  basic needs.’7 In this light, it becomes clear how development 
becomes a subject of  human rights. 
It has been suggested that there are generally two attitudes towards the pro-
cess of  development.8 The first approach is ‘fierce’ whereas the other approach is 
essentially a ‘friendly’ process.9 For the purposes of  this study, the fierce approach 
shall be referred to as the ‘Hard Knocks Theory’ whereas the friendly process 
shall be referred to as the ‘Liberal Theory of  Development.’
i. The Hard Knocks Theory
This theory sees development as a ‘fierce’ process. This fierce process does 
not make room for certain polices that may be considered as ‘soft-headed.’10 Exam-
ples of  such soft-headed policies include social safety nets for the poor such as 
welfare schemes and the provision of  social services for the population at large. 
Such soft-headed policies are considered the ‘luxury of  democracy’ which may be 
adopted only at the end of  the developmental process.11 The theory prioritises 
economic development and concentrates on improving the GDP of  the nation, 
the balance of  payments etc. Consequently, the ‘luxuries of  development’ play 
second fiddle to the macro- and micro-economic progress of  the nation. 
The implications of  such an approach are evident: the abuse of  human 
rights, large scale deprivation of  essential amenities to the poor and in some 
cases civil unrest and coup d’états. For instance, the Nkrumah administration 
6 Aryeetey et al. ‘The Right to Development Report, Ghana Country Study’, unpublished report, 
Ghana Legal Resources Centre, December 2004.
7 Administrator of  district assembly common fund, “Proposed formula for sharing the year 2001 
district assembly common fund”, Memo to parliament, June 7, 2001 [pg.2]
8 Sen A, ‘Development as freedom’ Oxford University Press (1999), 35.
9 Sen A, ‘Development as freedom’, 35.
10 Sen A, ‘Development as freedom’, 35.
11 Sen A, ‘Development as freedom’, 35.
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adopted this ‘hard knocks’ approach and while his regime produced some eco-
nomic progress it was notorious for its mass human rights abuses which eventu-
ally culminated in his overthrow from power.12 This only goes to demonstrate the 
unsuitability of  this approach in modern democracies.
ii. The Liberal Approach
The second approach is described as ‘friendly’ because it does not adopt the 
rugged and tough attitude of  the ‘hard knocks’ theory. Unlike the fierce approach, 
this approach makes room for the inclusion of  human freedoms and the so-called 
‘soft headed’ policies. It views development as a process aimed towards the expan-
sion of  the ‘real freedoms’ that people enjoy. Therefore, development is targeted 
at reducing escapable morbidity, increasing literacy levels, political participation 
and also increasing the availability of  basic necessities such as food, shelter and 
clothing. In this vein, expansion of  human freedoms is viewed as both the pri-
mary end and the principal means of  development. Human freedoms therefore 
play both a constitutive and an instrumental role in the process of  development.
It may be observed that the focus of  both theories is their distinguish-
ing factor. Under the liberal theory, the focus is not mere economic gain but 
rather the expansion of  human freedoms. This may be contrasted with the ‘hard 
knocks’ theory which is aimed primarily at the attainment of  national economic 
goals. It is submitted that it is this distinction that gives rise to the place of  the 
concept of  development in the human rights discourse. 
ii. The Right to Development
RTD has been described as ‘the alpha and omega of  human rights, the first and 
the last human right, the beginning and the end, the means and the goal of  human rights; in 
short, it is the core right from which all the others stem...’13 This graphic description of  
RTD is one of  the various ways in which writers have argued that the RTD is a 
fundamental human right that even pre-exists law.14 It has indeed been described 
as being as fundamental as the right to life.15
12 Aryeetey et al. ‘The Right to Development Report, Ghana Country Study’, unpublished report, 
Ghana Legal Resources Centre, December 2004.
13 Bedjaoui M, ‘The right to development’ in Bedjaoui M, International law; achievements and prospects, 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff  and UNESCO 1991, 1177.
14 Bedjaoui, ‘The right to development’, 1177.
15 Bedjaoui, ‘The right to development’, 1177.
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Some commentators have also described the right as being a collective hu-
man right because it is an aggregate of  the economic and cultural rights not of  
each individual, but of  all individuals constituting a ‘collectivity;’ their right to an 
equitable share in the economic and social well-being of  the world.16In response 
to such propositions, others have argued that indeed the formulation of  RTD is 
nothing more than a slogan.17 It has also been argued that the right to develop-
ment is unnecessary because its contents are already firmly established by the 
right to self-determination which allows a people to choose their own economic 
and social systems without interference.18
In spite of  the lack of  apparent consensus on the right to development, 
recent international discourse will reveal that the question as to whether RTD is 
even a right has been settled. The General Assembly DRD established the right 
to development and defined it as ‘an inalienable human right by virtue of  which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
can be fully realised.’19 Although this declaration did not receive unanimous support, 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of  Action unanimously endorsed 
RTD and called it ‘a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of  fundamental 
human rights.’20 The following paragraphs shall briefly deal with the characteristics 
of  the right to development.
First, the definition of  RTD in Article 1 of  the UNDRD has three prin-
ciples: (a) that the right to development is an inalienable human right; (b) that 
there is a particular process of  economic, social, cultural and political develop-
ment which is conducive to the realisation of  all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; (c) that the right to development is a human right that entitles every 
human person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to and enjoy that par-
ticular process of  development.21
16 See Abi-Saab G, “The legal formulation of  a right to development”, The right to development at the inter-
national level, The Hague, (1980)
17 Donnelly J, ‘In search of  the unicorn: The jurisprudence and politics of  the right to development’ 
15 California Western International Law Journal (1985), 473.
18 Donnelly J, ‘In search of  the unicorn: The jurisprudence and politics of  the right to development’, 
473.
19 Article 1, UNGA, Declaration on the Right to Development, U.N.Doc. A/RES>41/128(1986).
20 Vienna declaration and programme of  action: note by the secretariat, world conference on human 
rights, Part I, [10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (1993)
21 Kirchmeier F, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ Occasional Paper No. 23, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, (2006), 9.
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Secondly, RTD embraces the arguments presented by both opposing sides 
on the meaning of  the right. The right to development aims at ensuring devel-
opment for both the individual and peoples on both national and international 
platforms. As provided for by Article 1 of  the UNDRD, it is a right that ‘every 
human person and all peoples’ are entitled to.22 RTD is therefore both an individual 
right exercisable against the state as well as a collective right exercisable against 
the international community.
Thirdly, RTD hinges on the principle that all fundamental rights and free-
doms are indivisible and interdependent. It also requires that equal attention 
should be given to the promotion and protection of  all rights because the pro-
motion of  certain rights and freedoms cannot justify the denial of  others.23 To 
this extent, RTD embraces both 1977 Conventions and is viewed as a synthesis 
human right which goes beyond the mere aggregation of  existing human rights.24 
RTD thus finds expression in both civil and political rights on one side and so-
cial, economic and cultural rights on the other. At the same time, RTD maintains 
such a nature that makes it unique.
Finally, one may also observe that RTD does not imply a right to be devel-
oped or the right to live in a developed country. Rather, it seeks to provide an 
environment that is conducive to development. It is for this reason that Article 1 
of  the UNDRD reads ‘...development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
can be fully realized.’25 It is submitted that the operative expression there is ‘can be 
fully realized.’ In effect, the purpose of  RTD is to provide individuals and peoples 
with the opportunity to develop by creating a favourable atmosphere for devel-
opment by removing any obstacle that might hinder the process of  development.
IV. The Right Holder
Traditional human rights—civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights—are generally rights which are enforceable by individuals against the state. 
These rights are generally known as individual rights. There are also group rights 
which are enforceable by groups of  people as a collective. Such groups may be 
minority groups, indigenous communities or states claiming the right against a 
state or the international community as appropriate. In the case of  RTD, it has 
22 Article 1, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
23 Article 6(2), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
24 Aryeetey et al. ‘The Right to Development Report, Ghana Country Study’, unpublished report, 
Ghana Legal Resources Centre, December 2004.
25 Article 1, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
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two dimensions; it may be either an individual right or a collective right. The 
Declaration therefore names the human person as the central subject of  RTD.26It 
also requires all states to create a favourable international atmosphere for the 
realisation of  RTD.
The individual right to development is two-fold. Firstly, it entitles the indi-
vidual to all necessary fundamental human rights and systems that will equip him 
to participate in the developmental process. Secondly, it entitles the individual 
to actually participate in and contribute to the developmental process. Under 
this second theme, it should be noted that the participation and contribution of  
individuals should be meaningful contribution.27 It should not be the sort that is 
solely limited to local communities providing labour (carrying bricks) to reduce 
government expenditure.28 A case in point is the contribution of  free communal 
labour made by the local communities in the Sissala and Bolgatanga districts un-
der Ghana’s decentralisation program.29
As a collective right, states or smaller minority groups may claim under 
RTD.30 For instance Articles 22 and 23 of  the African Charter implicitly em-
power minority groups or indigenous communities such as the Endorois of  
Kenya to claim the right to development against a state.31 RTD may also be 
exercised by a state against the international community. Generally, states are the 
subjects of  international law and are therefore responsible for representing the 
interests of  their citizens before the international community. In the same vein, 
Article 22(2) of  the African Charter implicitly empowers a state to demand the 
creation of  a favourable international atmosphere for the realisation of  the right 
to development.32Article 22(2) of  the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights even makes it a duty for African states to ensure the exercise of  the right 
to development on behalf  of  its peoples. 
26 Article 2, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
27 Article 8(2), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
28 Aryeetey et al. ‘The Right to Development Report, Ghana Country Study’, unpublished report, 
Ghana Legal Resources Centre, December 2004.
29 Aryeetey et al. ‘The Right to Development Report, Ghana Country Study’, unpublished report, 
Ghana Legal Resources Centre, December 2004.
30 Article 22, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 21 ILM 58.
31 Centre for minority rights development v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75
32 Democratic Republic of  the Congo v Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda (2004) AHRLR 19.
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i. The State as a Duty Bearer
RTD imposes all the three kinds of  duties associated with traditional hu-
man rights in different aspects. It imposes the duty to respect, the duty to protect 
and the duty to fulfil.33
The duty to respect the right to development is implicit in the Declaration 
on RTD. The Declaration requires states to create an atmosphere favourable to 
the realisation of  RTD.34 This therefore implies a duty to refrain from those acts 
that will be inimical to the creation of  such an atmosphere. For instance states are 
compelled to refrain from acts that will amount to a violation of  human rights.
The duty to protect under the RTD is captured by Article 5 of  the Decla-
ration on RTD which stipulates that States shall take resolute steps to eliminate 
the massive and flagrant violations of  the human rights of  peoples and human 
beings affected by situations such as those resulting from apartheid, and threats 
against national sovereignty. In effect, RTD charges states to protect their citi-
zens from all possible obstacles that militate against the realisation of  the right 
to development.35
The duty to fulfil the RTD is expressed by the stipulation that states have 
the primary duty to create conditions favourable to the development of  both 
individuals and peoples.36This duty of  states includes the duty to formulate ap-
propriate national development policies aimed at the constant improvement of  
the well-being of  the entire population and of  all individuals, on the basis of  
their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of  the benefits resulting there from.37
ii. The International Community as a Duty Bearer
RTD imposes a duty on all states as a community to cooperate in creating 
an atmosphere favourable to the realisation of  the right to development.38 This is 
clearly a duty to be executed by the international community and not by a single 
state nor by a selected group of  states. The state bears the primary responsibil-
33 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and another v Nigeria, (2001) AHRLR 60.
34 Preamble, para. 3, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
35 Article 5, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
36 Article 8(1), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
37 Article 2(3), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
38 Preamble, UNGA, Declaration on the right to development.
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ity of  ensuring RTD for its citizens but where the duties are beyond the ability 
of  the state, the role of  the international community comes in to play.39 The 
problem with this is that the international community lacks those administrative 
organs that can be tasked with the execution of  such roles. The Declaration on 
RTD stipulates that this duty requires all states to engage in international coop-
eration with the aim of  creating an atmosphere favourable to the realisation of  
the right to development.40
The duty to respect the right to development therefore shall require all 
states to abstain from undertaking any policies or activities that would impede 
the right to development of  any state, especially developing states.41 Under the 
duty to protect, the international community may have to put in place measures 
that protect citizens from both domestic and foreign state that threaten their en-
joyment of  the Right to Development. It has actually been suggested that the in-
ternational community may even have to interfere with state sovereignty in order 
to protect citizens from their corrupt states. Lastly the duty to fulfil requires the 
formulation of  international developmental policies that will aid in the realisation 
of  the right to development.42 One may observe that this brief  examination of  
the duty of  the international community under the Right to Development raises 
some political concerns. It may thus be observed that one of  the main obstacles 
to consensus on the right to development is more a political one than a legal 
formulation one.
The requirement of  international cooperation under RTD has been argued 
by some factions as a requirement for fair international trade regimes and the 
removal of  burdening debt deficits43. It has also been argued as a demand for an 
equal share in the wealth of  the world economy.44 ‘Does this mean that the right to de-
velopment should be construed as a right to ‘development assistance’ or ‘a right to everything?’45 
It is submitted that the answer to this question is No. RTD requires that states 
create a favourable atmosphere for the realisation of  the right through inter-
national cooperation. It does not oblige developed countries to donate to less 
developed countries. Rather, RTD requires that an international legal framework 
that supports the realisation of  the right is created. Therefore, such ‘favourable’ 
39 Felix Kirchmeier, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ 9.
40 Article 3(2), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development
41 Article 3(3), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development
42 Article 4(1), UNGA, Declaration on the right to development
43 Felix Kirchmeier, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ 9.
44 Bedjaoui M, The right to development, 1177.
45 Felix Kirchmeier, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ 9.
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environment may be rather construed within the terms of  multilateral agree-
ments that seek to level the playing field by introducing fair market policies and 
abstention from international practices that would hinder the realisation of  the 
right to development. Development assistance should remain the prerogative of  
donor states through their foreign aid policies subject to the dictates of  the right 
to development. It is therefore proposed that the discourse on RTD should be 
rather focused on the actual legal implementation of  RTD. The focus should be 
geared towards providing viable solutions to remove the obstacles that impede 
the realisation of  the Right to Development.
V. Justiciability and Legal Enforcement of RTD at the Global Stage
There is no treaty that directly makes the obligations under RTD legally 
binding on states. It therefore stands to reason that a right which is not oppos-
able by the right holder against the duty bearer is not a right in the full legal 
sense.46 For this reason, lawyers of  the positivist school of  thought believe that 
if  a right is not legally enforceable, it cannot be regarded as a human right and 
should only be accorded the status of  a social aspiration.47 Be that as it may, RTD 
has been recognized as a legitimate fundamental human right.48 Consequently, 
the non-enforceability of  RTD as against its recognition as a fundamental hu-
man right challenges world leaders to secure the justiciability of  RTD globally 
through international law.49 Thus, it is very important to critically analyze the legal 
implications of  RTD because the conflicting views on its justiciability impede its 
realization.50
In light of  this conundrum, it has been suggested that RTD may still be en-
forced vicariously through other legally binding conventions.51 The basis of  this 
proposition is that the content of  RTD is such that its legal foundation includes 
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights which may be realized through 
46 Bedjaoui M, The right to development, 1177.
47 Olajumoke O. Oduwole, “International law and the right to development: A pragmatic approach for 
Africa”, Prince Claus Chair in development and equity 2013/2015, The Hague, 20 May 2014
48 Vienna declaration and programme of  action: Note by the secretariat, world conference on human 
rights, Part I, [10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (1993)
49 Bedjaoui M, The right to development, 1177.
50 Olajumoke O. Oduwole, “International law and the right to development: A pragmatic approach for 
Africa”, Prince Claus Chair in development and equity 2013/2015, The Hague, 20 May 2014
51 Felix Kirchmeier, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ 9.
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the enforcement of  the International Bill of  Rights.52 The legal foundation of  
RTD therefore has to be sought in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) which has attained the status of  customary international law, the Inter-
national Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In effect, this 
approach seeks to guarantee the realization of  RTD by identifying with other 
binding international treaties that also ensure the basic tenets of  RTD.
i. The African Peoples’ Right to Development
The African Charter is the only multilateral treaty that makes the right to 
development binding by making provision for a people’s right to development 
(PRTD). This treaty however does not have universal application. It is only bind-
ing on the member states of  the African Union such as Ghana. 
Article 22 (1) of  the African Charter provides that all peoples on the Af-
rican continent have a right to their economic, social and cultural development 
with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of  the 
common heritage of  mankind.53 The Charter therefore provides that the right to 
development is a collective right exercisable by a ‘people.’ This right entitles such 
peoples to a right to development as it pertains to their freedom and identity as a 
people and also as regards their interest in the wealth of  the world termed as ‘the 
common heritage of  mankind.’ The African Charter, however, does not provide 
any further details on the content of  the right.
Article 22(2) further complements the right with a duty for all member 
states either individually or collectively to ensure the exercise of  the right to 
development. A simple analysis of  this duty will reveal that Article 22 requires 
states to put in place national measures to ensure the realization of  the right. 
Also, African states are obliged to enter into regional multilateral agreements that 
will ensure the enjoyment of  the right. Once more, the African Charter does not 
provide further insight into what these duties involve.
It has been suggested that the legal enforcement of  RTD should adopt a 
pragmatic approach.54 This pragmatic approach demands that the focus should 
be aimed at the negative legal obligation of  states to refrain from undertakings 
52 Felix Kirchmeier, ‘The right to development- where do we stand?’ 9.
53 Article 22, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
54 Olajumoke O. Oduwole, “International law and the right to development: A pragmatic approach for 
Africa, ” Prince Claus Chair in development and equity 2013/2015, The Hague, 20 May 2014.
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that inhibit the realization of  RTD. The purpose of  this approach is to make the 
legal obligation of  duty-bearers more tangible and easier to enforce. Be that as 
it may, the African Commission has had opportunity to shed more light on the 
legal enforcement of  RTD.
In Sudan Human Rights Organization & Another v Sudan,55 the African 
Commission defined the concept of  peoples’ rights thereby establishing who 
qualifies to claim under PRTD. The Commission held that the concept of  a 
‘people’ includes certain characteristics that either the group may use to identify 
themselves or which other people may use to identify them. These characteris-
tics may include the language, religion and culture, the territory they occupy in a 
state, common history, and ethno-anthropological factors.56 Therefore by these 
standards, the ‘Darfurian’ people qualified to claim under Article 22 against the 
government of  Sudan.
In the landmark case of  Centre for Minority Rights Development v Kenya,57 the 
African Commission laid down the principle that established the duties of  states 
in relation to PRTD. It was held that RTD was a two-pronged test which was 
both constitutive and instrumental. The commission further held that recog-
nizing RTD requires the fulfilment of  the following criteria: ‘it must be equitable, 
non-discriminatory, accountable, participatory and transparent with equity and choice as the 
over-arching principles of  the right to development.’58 The Commission consequently ap-
plied this principle and found that the respondent state violated Article 22 by 
failing to respect the freedom of  choice of  the indigenous group because it 
did not conduct adequate consultations with the indigenous communities before 
displacing them.
Furthermore, in Democratic Republic of  the Congo (DR Congo) v 
Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda,59 where DR Congo sued its neighbors, it was 
held that the deprivation of  a people’s right to freely dispose of  their wealth and 
natural resources occasioned a violation of  Article 22 of  the African Charter. 
In the same case, it was also held that the indiscriminate killings and mass burial 
of  victims’ bodies was an affront to the cultural development of  the Congolese 
people under Article 22 of  the African Charter. This case perfectly illustrates 
how a state operates as a right holder of  RTD and the negative obligation on 
55 Sudan human rights organization & another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 153.
56 Sudan human rights organization & another v Sudan (2009) AHRLR 153.
57 Centre for minority rights development v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75.
58 Centre for minority rights development v Kenya (2009) AHRLR 75.
59 Democratic Republic of  the Congo v Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda (2004) AHRLR 19.
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states to refrain from any undertaking that could hinder the right to development 
in any way.
It, however, appears that there may be some limitations to PRTD. In As-
sociation pour la Sauvegarde de la Paix au Burundi v Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Zaire (DRC), Zambia,60 and the African Commission held that the 
right to development may be subject to overriding interests such as international 
peace and security. The Commission explained that there was no violation of  
Article 22 where the respondent states had imposed an embargo on Burundi in 
an attempt to discourage the civil strife in the country. This is because they also 
had a legitimate interest in the peace and security of  that region.
Moreover, the duty of  states to ensure the fulfilment of  RTD is subject to 
the doctrine of  progressive realization. In Gunme and Others v Cameroon,61 the 
African Commission had the opportunity to establish the role of  states in the 
provision of  basic amenities under the Right to Development. It was held that 
the obligation of  States is to invest its resources in the best possible way to attain 
progressive realization of  the right to development. The Commission explained 
that although this process may not satisfy all parties in the state, it is not enough 
to occasion a violation of  Article 22.
One cannot help but admit that the decisions of  the African Commission 
examined under this section lay the foundation for the legal enforcement and 
justiciability of  RTD. Admittedly, the case law on the right to development is 
not voluminous but the work of  the Commission so far is invaluable to the legal 
analysis of  the right to development.
ii. The Justiciability and the Enforcement of the Right to Development 
Under the Constitution of Ghana 
The 1992 Constitution of  Ghana (hereinafter called ‘the Constitution’) 
contains a comprehensive bill of  rights in its Chapter Five. The bill of  rights un-
der the Constitution provides for civil and political rights such as the protection 
of  individual liberty as well as socio-economic rights like the right to education.62 
However, there is no express mention of  the right to development under the 
Constitution of  Ghana. It is nonetheless important to note that the Constitution 
60 Association pour la sauvegarde de la paix au Burundi v Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire 
(DRC), Zambia (2003) AHRLR 111.
61 Gunme and others v Cameroon(2009) AHRLR 9.
62 See Articles 14 and 25, Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
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of  Ghana is dualist and therefore any signed international treaty may be legally 
enforceable in Ghana if  it is ratified by an Act of  Parliament.
So far, this study has revealed that the provisions of  RTD embodied in the 
UN Declaration for the Right to Development are soft law. Also, it has shown 
that the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights makes the right to devel-
opment legally binding through PRTD. Therefore, it would appear that PRTD 
should at least be legally enforceable in Ghana. Yet, there is no legislation or judi-
cial precedent pronouncing PRTD as justiciable or legally enforceable in Ghana. 
Therefore, the following sections shall attempt to determine if  the right to devel-
opment is justiciable or legally enforceable in Ghana by examining the enforce-
ment of  international law and general human rights under the Constitution.
iii. Enforcement of International Law under the Constitution
The hierarchy of  laws recognized by the 1992 Constitution does not 
include international law.63 It does, however, recognize enactments made by 
or under the authority of  the Parliament established under the Constitution.64 
Furthermore, Article 75(2) of  the Constitution stipulates that any international 
treaty or convention executed by the President shall be subject to ratification by 
an Act of  Parliament or by a parliamentary resolution supported by the votes 
of  more than half  the members of  Parliament. The combined effect of  these 
constitutional provisions is that international treaties or conventions signed by 
the President of  Ghana lack direct application in the courts of  Ghana unless 
Parliament approves such a treaty either through the mechanism of  an Act of  
Parliament or a parliamentary resolution. 
It has been suggested that there are four ways in which an international 
treaty may be incorporated into municipal law.65 The first means is by direct 
incorporation of  the particular international treaty into the Constitution of  the 
legal system, an Act of  Parliament or a bill of  rights.66 The second means is 
through transformation or incorporation where a statement in the preamble of  a 
legislation expressly states that the legislation in question is giving legal effect to 
an international treaty or convention.67 Thirdly, an international instrument may 
63 Article 11, Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
64 Article 11 (1) (b), Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
65 Appiagyei Atua K, ‘Ghana at 50: The place of  international human rights norms in the courts’ in 
Bonsu H et al (eds) Ghana since independence: History, development and prospects, 2007, 118.
66 Appiagyei Atua K, ‘Ghana at 50: The place of  international human rights norms in the courts’, 118.
67 Appiagyei Atua K, ‘Ghana at 50: The place of  international human rights norms in the courts’, 118.
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be incorporated by ‘inferred implementation’ whereby an enacted legislation is made 
to give effect to the obligations spelt out in the international treaty.68 Lastly, in-
corporation may be done through legislation that indirectly gives effect to treaty 
commitments without directly making reference to the particular international 
instrument.69
Interestingly, Ghana has signed a large number of  international treaties 
and conventions including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.70 
However, it is quite unfortunate that the Parliament of  Ghana has not ratified 
nearly as many treaties and conventions including the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights.71 It would therefore appear that the provisions of  the African 
Charter are not applicable in the Ghanaian courts. Be that as it may, Article 40 
of  the Constitution imposes a duty on the government of  Ghana to promote 
respect for treaty obligations and adhere to principles enshrined in international 
organizations of  which Ghana is a member.72 Article 40 of  the Constitution 
therefore empowers the courts in Ghana to hold the government of  Ghana 
accountable to all its obligations under the international treaties and conventions 
it has signed but is yet to ratify. This includes the obligations of  Ghana under the 
African Charter such as the exercise of  the right to development under Article 22 
of  the African Charter. It is therefore submitted that the rights and obligations 
enshrined under PRTD can be enforced in the Ghanaian courts against the 
government of  Ghana. 
This assertion is supported by the decision in the case of  New Patriotic 
Party v Inspector General of  Police.73 In this case, the Supreme Court relied on 
international law and stated per Archer CJ that the African Charter can be relied 
upon although a specific legislation had not been passed to give effect to it. He 
reasoned that this was because Ghana was a signatory to the African Charter and 
therefore had a duty to recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in 
the Charter.74
68 Appiagyei Atua K, ‘Ghana at 50: The place of  international human rights norms in the courts’, 118.
69 Appiagyei Atua K, ‘Ghana at 50: The place of  international human rights norms in the courts’, 118.
70 Quansah E K, ‘An examination of  the use of  international law as an interpretative tool in human 
rights litigation in Ghana and Botswana’ in Killander M (ed), International law and domestic human rights 
litigation in Africa, Pretoria University Law Press, 2010, 37.
71 Quansah E K, ‘An examination of  the use of  international law as an interpretative tool in human 
rights litigation in Ghana and Botswana’, 37.
72 Article 40 (c) and (d), Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
73 New Patriotic Party v Inspector General of  Police [1993-94] 2 GLR 459.
74 New Patriotic Party v Inspector General of  Police [1993-94] 2 GLR 459.
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It is therefore submitted that the provisions of  the African Charter on the 
right to development are capable of  application by the Ghanaian courts. This is 
because Article 40 of  the Constitution empowers the Ghanaian courts to hold 
the government of  Ghana accountable to its obligations under international in-
struments, such as the African Charter, that have been signed but are yet to be 
ratified. It should, however, be noted that Article 40 of  the Constitution is cap-
tured under the Directive Principles of  State Policy in chapter 6. The justiciability 
of  these directive principles are limited to some extent and shall be discussed in 
a later section.
iv. General Enforcement of Human Rights Under the Constitution
The Constitution of  Ghana makes provision for a bill of  rights in 
Chapter 5. The bill of  rights provides for civil and political rights as well as 
socio-economic rights which are all enforceable. In that vein, Article 33 of  the 
Constitution provides a mechanism for the enforcement of  fundamental human 
rights under the Constitution. Article 33(1) stipulates that any person alleging a 
violation of  their fundamental human rights may apply to the High Court which 
is empowered to make the appropriate orders to give effect to the provisions of  
Chapter 5.75 The personal interest requirement under Article 33 therefore does 
not make room for public interest litigation. 
However, the Supreme Court of  Ghana has held that a person without a 
personal interest in a human rights claim may sue under Article 2 of  the Consti-
tution if  the suit is in the public interest.76 It is also interesting to note that the 
wording of  Article 33(1) suggests that there are avenues other than the High 
Court where an aggrieved person can seek redress for a violation of  their human 
rights. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, whose 
functions include investigation of  complaints of  human rights violations is one 
such ‘lawful avenue’ within the contemplation of  Article 33(1).77 In effect, one may 
observe that the Constitution has an elaborate mechanism put in place for the 
enforcement of  fundamental human rights recognized under the Constitution.
In relation to the right to development, Chapter 5 does not make any ex-
press provision for it. It is, however, submitted that the bill of  rights under the 
75 Article 33(2), Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
76 Adjei - Ampofo v Accra metropolitan assembly and attorney general (No 1) [2007-2008] SCGLR 
611; see also Sam (No2) v attorney general [2000] SCGLR 305
77 See Articles 216 and 218, Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
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Constitution implicitly enforces the right to development. This study has re-
vealed that both civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights form 
the basic foundations of  the right to development. Therefore, the joint operation 
of  both civil and political rights, together with socio-economic rights under the 
Constitution guarantees the enjoyment of  the right to development in Ghana. 
The right to development is therefore indirectly enforceable through the direct 
enforcement of  civil, political, social and economic rights already provided for 
by the Constitution.
Moreover, the right to development is enforceable under the provisions of  
Article 33(5) of  the Constitution. The Constitution does not make express pro-
vision for a right to development. However, Article 33(5) of  the Constitution 
provides that human rights which have not been specifically mentioned in chapter 
5 of  the Constitution are applicable so far as they are rights which are inherent in 
a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of  mankind. There 
is no judicial pronouncement on the meaning and scope of  rights “considered to 
be inherent in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of  mankind.”78 
However, in the case of  Ghana Lotto Operators Association v National Lottery 
Authority, the Supreme Court of  Ghana stated that in order to enforce the provi-
sion of  Article 33(5), a person must allege violation of  fundamental human rights 
which have not been specifically mentioned by chapter 5 of  the Constitution but 
which have been provided for by international instruments such as the African 
Charter.79 It is therefore submitted that those fundamental human rights which 
are not specifically mentioned in chapter 5 of  the Constitution but are guaranteed 
in international treaties are rights to be considered as inherent in a democracy and 
intended to secure the freedom and dignity of  mankind. In that vein, it is further 
submitted that the right to development captured under Article 22 of  the African 
Charter is enforceable under Article 33(5) of  the Constitution as a right inherent 
in a democracy and intended to secure the freedom and dignity of  mankind.
VI. Fundamental Human Rights and the Directive Principles of 
State Policy
Admittedly, the Constitution does not make express mention of  the right 
to development. However, there are certain provisions that give effect to the 
78 Article 33(5), Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
79 Ghana Lotto Operators Association and others v National Lottery Authority [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 
1088.
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commitments recognized under RTD. For instance, Article 40(b) stipulates that 
the government shall seek the establishment of  a just and equitable international 
economic and social order. One may observe that Article 40(b) of  the is very 
similar to paragraph 3 of  the preamble to the Declaration to RTD and to Article 
3(3) of  the same declaration which also recognizes the need for an international 
economic and social order in order to secure the realization of  RTD. Moreover, 
Article 37 also contains provisions that indirectly give effect to state obligations 
recognized under RTD. For instance, Article 37 (2) (a) makes provision for the 
participation of  the individual in the developmental process. In the same vein, 
Article 37 (3) stipulates that the government of  Ghana ‘shall be guided by interna-
tional human rights instruments which recognize and apply particular categories of  human 
rights to the development process.’ It would therefore appear that certain elements of  
the right to development find expression in the Constitution. The main ques-
tion, however, is if  these provisions captured under the Directive Principles of  
State Policy can be interpreted as fundamental human rights justiciable under the 
Constitution.
It has also been argued in preceding paragraphs that Article 40 of  the Con-
stitution imposes a duty on the government of  Ghana to adhere to its obligations 
under treaties such as the African Charter. Consequently, it was then submitted 
that the Ghanaian courts could hold the government of  Ghana accountable to 
its treaty obligations under the African Charter. In view of  this, it is important 
to point out Article 40 of  the falls under the Directive Principles of  State Policy. 
Thus, the issue of  whether or not the Ghanaian courts can hold the government 
of  Ghana accountable to its obligations under the African charter is dependent 
on justiciability or otherwise of  chapter 6.
As stated earlier, Article 33(5) of  the Constitution recognizes other funda-
mental human rights that are not expressly mentioned under Chapter 5 of  the 
Constitution. This sub-section shall make an attempt to determine if  other pro-
visions of  the not captured under Chapter 5 of  the Constitution but rather cap-
tured under Chapter 6 may be interpreted as fundamental human rights equally 
enforceable under the Constitution.
Chapter 6 of  the 1992 Constitution provides for the Directive Principles 
of  State Policy.80 Article 34(1) of  the Constitution provides that the Directive 
Principles of  State Policy shall guide all citizens and state institutions as well as 
political parties in the application and interpretation of  the Constitution. Chapter 
80 See Articles 34 to 41, Constitution of  Ghana (1992).
Asare Larbi Paa Kwame
94 Strathmore Law Review, January 2016
6 therefore operates as a guide to the interpretation of  the Ghanaian Constitu-
tion and the laws of  Ghana. It also serves as a policy guide for government and 
a yardstick against which the Ghanaian people can measure the performance of  
their government. On the question of  the justiciability of  the directive principles, 
it has been suggested by the Committee of  Experts of  the Draft Constitution 
1992 that the directive principles are not in themselves justiciable and enforce-
able but are nothing more than mere guides to interpretation and construction.81
Fortunately, the Supreme Court of  Ghana has made some judicial pro-
nouncements on the justiciability of  the Directive Principles of  State Policy cap-
tured under Chapter 6.The first case to make a judicial pronouncement on the 
justiciability of  chapter 6 is New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General (31st Decem-
ber Case).82 In this case, it was held that the Directive Principles of  State Policy 
are justiciable. The basis of  that decision was that the Constitution as a whole is a 
justiciable document and that if  any part of  the Constitution was non-justiciable, 
the Constitution itself  had to state it. The court therefore reasoned that in the 
absence of  such internal evidence, the Directive Principles of  State Policy are 
justiciable and can be applied by the courts. This decision therefore establishes 
that the justiciability of  the provisions in chapter 6 is unqualified.
The Supreme Court of  Ghana reached a different conclusion in the case of  
New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General (Ciba Case).83 Here, the plaintiff  con-
tended that the Council of  Indigenous Business Associations Law 1993 (PND-
CL 213) is inconsistent with and in contravention ofArticles 21(1) (e) and 37 (2) 
(a) and (3). The Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection on the grounds 
that the claim of  the plaintiff  was based on Directive Principles of  State Policy 
captured under Chapter 6 of  the Constitution and was therefore not justicia-
ble. The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the preliminary objection and 
held that although the Directive Principles of  State Policy were not justiciable in 
themselves they served as goals for legislative programs and guides for judicial 
interpretation. 
However, the Court (per Bamford Addo and Sophia Akuffo JJSC) explained 
that the Directive Principles of  State Policy were not completely non-justiciable. 
In some cases, the provisions of  chapter 6 of  the may be held to be justiciable. 
These are cases where the provisions in chapter 6 do not stand on their own but 
81 Bimpong-Buta S Y, The Role of  the Supreme Court in the development of  Constitutional Law in Ghana, Ad-
vanced Legal Publications, 2007, 348.
82 New Patriotic Party v Attorney-General [1993-94] 2 GLR 35.
83 New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (Ciba Case) [1996-97] SCGLR 729.
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qualify rights already provided for in chapter 5. The Court reasoned that those 
provisions in Chapter 6 that qualified other human rights provisions and specific 
guarantees such as the right of  association could be interpreted as justiciable only 
on those terms. Therefore, the decision of  the Court is that directive principles 
of  state policy are justiciable in so far as they qualify other human rights provi-
sions. The example given by Sophia Akuffo JSC in that case was that Article 
37(2) (a) and (3) qualified Article 21(1) (e) and is therefore justiciable on those 
terms. It is thus submitted that this decision generally raises a presumption of  
non-justiciability against the provisions in chapter 6. This presumption is only 
rebutted on a case by case analysis where the circumstances of  the case indicate 
that the provisions in chapter 6 qualify a substantive right provided for in chapter 
5.
Interestingly, in the more recent case of  Ghana Lotto Operators v National 
Lottery Authority, the Supreme Court of  Ghana adopted a different approach 
to the justiciability of  the Directive Principles of  State Policy.84 It was held that 
these directive principles are presumed to be justiciable unless the provisions 
lend themselves to an interpretation which renders them unenforceable. The 
court explained that although the directive principles are presumed to be justi-
ciable, under certain circumstances, certain provisions in chapter 6 would not be 
enforceable. The distinction between the decision in Ghana Lotto Operators v 
National Lottery Authority and the decision in New Patriotic Party v Attorney-
General (Ciba Case) is that the former decision unlike the latter raises a pre-
sumption of  justiciability in favor of  the provisions in chapter 6. The Supreme 
Court in the Ghana Lotto Operators case held that all the prior decisions on the 
justiciability of  chapter 6 including the decision in the Ciba case did not lay down 
binding precedent. This is because both prior decisions on the justiciability of  
the provisions in chapter 6 are conflicting. The court therefore took that oppor-
tunity to lay down a new principle. 
The issue to be addressed now is if  the provisions in Articles 40, 37 (2) (a) 
and (3) which implicitly give effect to the right to development are justiciable. It 
appears that there is no binding decision in Ghana on the justiciability or oth-
erwise of  the Directive Principles of  State Policy. This is because the Supreme 
Court decisions discussed above establish different principles. The 31st Decem-
ber case held that the provisions in chapter 6 are justiciable without qualification. 
The Ciba case held that the directive principles were by themselves non-justicia-
84 Ghana Lotto Operators Association and others v National Lottery Authority [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 1088.
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ble except where they qualified substantive rights in Chapter 5. The Ghana Lotto 
Operators case on its part held that the provisions in chapter 6 were generally 
justiciable except in cases where the provisions lend themselves to an interpreta-
tion that renders them unenforceable. In view of  this, this study will apply the 
decision in the Ghana Lotto Operators case. It is thus submitted that the provi-
sions in Articles 40, 37 (2) (a) and (3) which implicitly give effect to the right 
to development are justiciable. This means that those provisions which enforce 
commitments recognized under RTD are enforceable in the Ghanaian courts. It 
also follows that the earlier argument raised that the Ghanaian court can hold 
the government of  Ghana accountable to its treaty obligations is valid. This 
is because the justiciability of  the Directive Principles of  State Policy includes 
Article 40 which empowers the courts to hold the government so accountable is 
also justiciable.
It is admitted that the implicit reference to the right to development in 
the Constitution may not be as extensive as is desirable. However, this does not 
erode the existence of  the right to development under the Ghanaian Constitu-
tion. This is because Article 33(5) of  the Constitution empowers the courts to 
apply Article 22 of  the African Charter. Furthermore, the courts may make ref-
erence to the decisions of  the African Commission on the enforcement of  the 
right to development. That is to say, there is a source of  persuasive case law the 
courts may resort to for assistance in interpretation and enforcement of  the right 
to development.
VII. Conclusion and Recommendation
The aim of  this study is to determine if  the right to development is jus-
ticiable and legally enforceable by the Ghanaian courts. In order to do so, the 
study has examined the contents of  RTD under the UNDRD, analyzed RTD 
under Article 22 of  the African Charter and examined its application under the 
Constitution of  Ghana.
i. Conclusions
The conclusions reached by this study shall be summarized in the following 
points:
1. The Ghanaian courts may enforce the right to development either as 
international law or as a human right implicitly guaranteed under the 
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Constitution of  Ghana. This is in spite of  the fact that the African 
Charter has not been formally incorporated into national law and nei-
ther is RTD specifically mentioned in the Constitution. This claim is 
supported by the following arguments:
a) Although the African Charter has not been formally incorpo-
rated into national law, Article 40 empowers the Ghanaian court 
to hold the government of  Ghana accountable to its treaty ob-
ligations under the African Charter. Also, Article 33(5) of  the 
Constitution opens the door for the courts to enforce Article 22 
of  the African Charter as a fundamental human right under the 
Constitution. 
b) Although the Constitution does not make specific mention of  
the right to development, it is implicitly guaranteed through the 
joint operation of  civil and political rights as well as socio-eco-
nomic rights. Thus, the right to development to a certain extent 
may be enforceable under Article 33 of  the Constitution. 
c) The provisions of  Chapter 6 that guarantee the right to devel-
opment under the Constitution are justiciable. The courts may 
therefore apply them in the enforcement of  the right to develop-
ment under the Constitution.
2. Although, the UN DRD is soft law, the right to development captured 
under Article 22 of  the African Charter imposes binding obligations 
on member states of  the African Union including Ghana. Ghana may 
thus be held accountable under the African Charter. Furthermore, the 
judicial decisions of  the African Commission on the enforcement of  
the right to development serve as persuasive precedent for national 
courts.
ii. Recommendations
1. It has been observed that there is no case law on the right to de-
velopment in Ghana. It is suggested that this is a result of  the fact 
that lawyers do not base their arguments on violations of  the right to 
development. In effect, the Ghanaian Courts have not been granted 
the opportunity to pronounce on the justiciability or otherwise of  the 
right to development under the Constitution of  Ghana. It is therefore 
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recommended that legal practitioners submit arguments on the right 
to development when presenting their cases before the courts. This 
will grant the courts the opportunity to decide on the justiciability of  
the right to development.
2. It is also recommended that the Courts encourage public interest 
litigation by adopting a liberal approach to questions of  capacity and 
standing. This would make it easier for interested parties to institute 
actions before the Courts in order to promote the enforcement of  the 
right to development under the Constitution. It would also encourage 
civic responsibility on the part of  citizens who are more financially 
capable of  instituting suits before the courts. This would go a long way 
to promote the enforcement of  the right to development in Ghana.
3. Lastly, it is recommended the courts adopt a liberal approach to the 
interpretation and enforcement of  the right to development. It is sub-
mitted that adopting a liberal approach to construe the right to devel-
opment in line with the spirit of  the Constitution would promote the 
enjoyment of  the right under the Constitution.
